On Terrorism

When civilians are the main target, there is no need to consider the cause. That's terrorism; it's evil.

Igor Mitoraj, Eros Bendato, Iron Sculpture

Introduction

The widely accepted definition of terrorism by political philosopher Igor Primoratz is “the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating them, or other people, into a course of action they otherwise would not take" (Primoratz, 1990). I will argue that this definition is insufficient because acts of last resort are excluded from terrorism. It emphasises the strategic nature of terrorism and does not consider the context of the act and its effects. While such a definition identifies what classifies as terrorism, it does not determine whether it is always evil. Furthermore, evil refers to the immoral infliction of suffering, especially when premeditated or driven by cruelty.

My argument supports the following two claims:

Claim 1: When civilians are the main target of an intentional act of violence, it is not automatically an act of terrorism. There are exceptional cases – we should consider the cause.

Claim 2: When civilians are the main target of an intentional act of violence, it is not automatically evil, even if it is an act of terrorism – we should consider the cause.

The clarification of intentional violence in both claims excludes violence that arises from mental illness or impaired judgement, where intent and rational aim are absent. This ensures the moral questions pertain to intentional acts of violence targeting civilians, where the attacker consciously directs harm towards non-combatants for a broader goal. Therefore, while targeting civilians is a grave moral wrong and typically constitutes terrorism, there are cases in which we must consider the cause and thus declaring it evil is a morally detached and ethically ignorant judgement.

Claim 1: an intentional act of violence is not automatically an act of terrorism

It is important to consider that instances of targeting civilians must align with the accepted definition of terrorism. I will argue that in addition to Primoratz’s three conditions for defining terrorism.

To be constituted as terrorism, the fourth and fifth conditions are necessary:

1. The deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use;

2. Targeted against innocent people;

3. With the aim of intimidating them or other people, into a course of action they would otherwise not take;

4. There are reasonable non-violent alternatives available but not pursued (the last resort condition);

5. Without the intention of bringing about a greater good. I will be defending this definition of terrorism, in which an act is only considered terrorism if it meets all five conditions.

An act needs to be a last resort with the intention of bringing about a greater good to be excluded for being considered terrorism.

To answer the question of why we should have these conditions for terrorism, consider the Selma riots in 1965 (Hillstrom, 2014), which led to the destruction of civilian-owned shops. While the riots targeted civilians, they cannot be considered terrorism because it forced national attention to racial injustice. This directly contributed to the Voting Rights Act in the same year, and it can be argued that without this, the civil rights movement may not have progressed as far. In this case, targeting civilians was a last resort in service of a greater good. If one were to reject this reasoning and insist that any targeting of civilians is automatically terrorism, then they would be forced to label the civil rights movement as terrorism. This is a counterintuitive and morally implausible position. It is difficult to conceive of the Selma protests as terrorism without undermining the moral legitimacy of the civil rights struggle as a whole. This example makes it more plausible that the two additional conditions are the necessary components of a morally legitimate definition of terrorism.

Conversely, acknowledging that the Selma riots involved targeting civilians does not require labelling the whole civil rights movement as terrorism – just because the riots involved a destructive form of protest, it does not delegitimise the broader movement. However, this response fails to consider the importance of Selma within the civil rights context, as it was central to the campaign’s impact in which the riots were instrumental in provoking legislative change. By isolating Selma as terrorism, we ignore the political significance of the event, and by extension, weaken the legitimacy of the civil rights movement. The idea that such a decisive moment can be morally condemned in isolation is implausible. Once we accept that Selma advanced a greater good and occurred in a context where non-violent alternatives had repeatedly failed, it becomes clear that any definition of terrorism must account for these conditions.

The intentional targeting of civilians is universally condemned under international law as a moral wrong, yet we find ourselves asking if there is any instance in which targeting civilians can be justified under the doctrine of self-defence or the pursuit of a ‘greater good’. In particular, the notion that targeting civilians may serve as a strategic mechanism to end a conflict and thereby minimising the overall suffering. This can be seen in the decision of the United States to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 which killed over 200,000 people yet expedited the end of the Second World War (Tibbets & LeMay, 2022). The use of such extreme force utilitarianly minimises total casualties on both sides, preventing prolonged human suffering. The fact that Japan surrendered the following day demonstrates the act of immediacy that prevented further suffering, meeting the “greater good” condition. Moreover, it was authorised after extensive diplomatic efforts, indicating that non-violent alternatives were exhausted. Therefore, while the bombings clearly involved the targeting of civilians, they failed to meet the fourth and fifth conditions of terrorism, and if we were to label the bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki as terrorism, we would paradoxically have to accept that the act which prevented further suffering is terrorism.

In accordance with Just War Theory, we can define the Last Resort condition as the aim to prevent serious and imminent harm, such as mass civilian casualties or prolonged war; it must be guided by a morally legitimate aim as opposed to self-interested ambitions; and all non-violent alternatives must have been exhausted (Walzer, 1977). Underlying causes can lead to last-resort acts; these must be considered when aiming to prevent imminent harm like mass casualties or prolonged war. This act can be done with the intention of bringing about a greater good - with significantly fewer casualties on both sides.

Through this discussion, we have justified the merits of the second claim because in the first claim we are aware that there exists an act of last resort, and the defining properties of an act of last resort exclude it from being an evil act.

Claim 2: an intentional act of violence, is not automatically evil, even if it is an act of terrorism

We ought to consider the motivation behind an attack on civilians before making an absolute moral judgement about its nature. Terrorist acts are not always evil, especially when driven by desperation rather than cruelty. The concept of evil does not just imply causing harm but causing harm with malevolent motivation – acting with cruelty towards the suffering of others. In this context, we must consider the motivation when determining whether all terrorist attacks should be treated as evil without considering the cause. When terrorism emerges from systemic oppression or prolonged injustice, the moral clarity of whether it is evil begins to dissolve. For instance, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) employed tactics that satisfy the definition of terrorism through bombings that targeted civilians during its campaign against the British rule in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 1997 (Boyne, 2023). These actions were designed to force political concessions and end the perceived British colonial occupation and systemic discrimination. The acts stem from political oppression rather than malice; while not justified, they complicate the label of evil.

One may oppose this, arguing that regardless of the context or motivation, deliberately harming innocent civilians is always evil because moral responsibility cannot be erased by circumstance. From this perspective, acknowledging systemic injustice may explain terrorism, but does not excuse it. However, this position fails to account for the reality that moral judgement must consider the conditions under which a choice is made. To label these individuals as evil is to ignore the oppressive systems that forced them into the last resort of violent resistance. The term “evil” obscures the role of structural violence and shifts all moral responsibility onto the least empowered. The true moral failure may lie not in the desperate act itself, but in the long-standing injustices that make such acts feel necessary.

In cases where civilians are targeted by individuals who have been radicalised through extremist interpretations of religious scripture or manipulated by powerful ideological narratives, the line between moral agency and victimhood begins to blur. For instance, young individuals recruited into terrorist organisations are often indoctrinated from a young age, exposed to one-sided interpretations of religious duty and psychologically isolated from broader moral perspectives. In such cases, the attackers may genuinely believe they are serving a divine or moral cause, acting not out of hatred or cruelty, but out of what they perceive as righteous necessity. From this perspective, these acts, while still violent and tragic, are not purely evil in the conventional sense, because the attackers themselves are victims of systemic manipulation and belief systems beyond their full understanding or control.

One could oppose this argument with the position that even if an individual has been coerced into believing that his or her actions would serve a higher cause, the intentional targeting of civilians remains evil because people retain a degree of rational judgement in which the deliberate infliction of harm on innocent civilians is never morally excused, regardless of the cause. From this perspective, the motive is not important because evil lies in the outcome, regardless of the attacker’s beliefs. However, labelling their actions as evil without acknowledging their manipulated state shifts the weight away from those who intentionally cultivated the ideology. While it remains an act of terrorism, it is unclear whether the actor is evil or not, given that they are a product of exploitation. In such cases, evil may reside more in the system that creates the attacker than in the attackers themselves. When individuals are indoctrinated from a young age, their capacity for autonomous moral reasoning is significantly diminished, meaning that while the act may constitute as a form of terrorism, it is not always evil. If victimhood passes a certain threshold, responsibility shifts to the system – as seen in the case of Shamima Begum, who left the UK as a teenager to become part of The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a designated terrorist organisation. While her actions cannot be excused, her exposure to radical propaganda left her impressionable to suggest a degree of moral disempowerment. To call her evil without qualification is to ignore the structural forces that shaped her decisions.

Conclusion

My argument for Claim 1 relies on clear intuitive examples of something that excludes terrorism; to overturn this, the opposing side would have to provide an equal or greater set of examples to suggest that this is not the case. To not consider the cause, ignores the crucial distinction between acts of cruelty and acts of desperation. To determine whether an act is terrorist or evil, we must assess not only its immediate features, but also whether reasonable non-violent alternatives existed; whether it aimed to prevent prolonged suffering, and whether the actors possessed legitimate moral agency. Similarly, classifying all acts that target civilians as terrorism without regard for motive or necessity, obscures morally relevant distinctions. To preserve moral clarity, we must consider the motivations, constraints, and broader goals behind such acts. Therefore, targeting civilians is not automatically terrorism, nor is it inherently evil – to say otherwise is to ignore the very ethical reasoning that allows us to condemn violence meaningfully.

Bibliography

Boyne, S. (2023). Inside The Ira - Organization And Command | The Ira & Sinn Fein | FRONTLINE | PBS. Pbs.org. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/inside/org.html

Hillstrom, L. C. (2014). The Voting Rights Act of 1965. Omnigraphics, Credo Reference.

Primoratz, I. (1990). What Is Terrorism? Journal of Applied Philosophy, 7(2), 129–138. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5930.1990.tb00261.x

Tibbets, P., & LeMay, C. (2022). Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki - 1945 - Nuclear Museum. Nuclear Museum. https://ahf.nuclearmuseum.org/ahf/history/bombingshiroshima-and-nagasaki-1945/

UK: Judgement on Shamima Begum’s citizenship is “disappointing.” (2023). @AmnestyUK. https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/uk-judgement-shamima-begums-citizenshipdisappointing?utm_source=google&utm_medium=grant&utm_campaign=BRD_AWA_G EN_dynamic-searchads&utm_content=&gad_source=1&gad_campaignid=1717255123&gbraid=0AAAAADv ZPbL7XmJ2ayshiTYwvLvspmb5z&gclid=Cj0KCQjwyvfDBhDYARIsAItzbZHmtSThRZQP 4PYXIg9d2kCGfUUvID-YWs6XTcp2TJxxq5KGVGJfEo8aAtOzEALw_wcB

Walzer, M. (1977). Just and unjust wars. Basic Books.

Highly Commended Philosophy essay finalist at the John Locke Institute's Global Essay Prize (2025)

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