On the Limits of the State

What limits can the state impose on the right to procreate?

Procreation refers to the act of bringing new life into the world, in this case, we will just consider procreation between humans. State limits imply legal restrictions such as forced sterilisation imposed by governments on the individuals of the state. To avoid the unrealistic argument of a truly benevolent dictator, I will argue under the assumption that we are working with imperfect governments as a truly benevolent dictator does not exist. At stake is the balance between civil liberties, particularly bodily autonomy and personal freedom and the state’s duty to protect vulnerable citizens, including children.

Ultimately, I contend that while the state has a duty to protect the welfare of its citizens, this interest

cannot override the inviolable right of individuals to procreate.

In many liberal democracies, procreation is treated as a fundamental sovereign right, with the U.S. Supreme Court in Skinner v. Oklahoma declaring it “one of the basic civil rights of man” (“Skinner v. Oklahoma Ex Rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)”). Any state restriction would therefore not only risk violating constitutional protections but also repeat historical abuses such as forced sterilisations in Nazi Germany, the American eugenics movement, and the treatment of Uyghur Muslims in China. Granting the state legal authority over procreation creates a slippery slope, seeing as defining who is fit or unfit to reproduce is inevitably open to abuse. It is important that we argue beyond the slippery slope, seeing as the action of violating someone’s right to bodily autonomy is in itself a fundamentally flawed action and a massive overreach in state intervention, regardless of the benevolence of the state.

Proponents of state limits on procreation would argue that governments already intervene in family life to protect children—for example, removing them from abusive homes and providing medical care, so preventing reproduction in extreme cases could be seen as a natural extension of this duty. Just as free speech can be restricted to prevent harm, the state might prioritise a child’s right to a minimally decent life over absolute parental freedom.

However, this argument is reductive because intervening before a child exists is fundamentally different from intervening after harm is evident, and the criteria for “unfit” parents’ risks abuse if the state is granted such power. Just because there is a chance that the child may experience neglect, it does not mean the state should have the ability to selectively violate the rights of their citizens. If our primary justification for the state imposing on the right to procreate is to protect the wellbeing of its citizens, then there are less invasive ways that do not violate the liberties of its citizens such as informing all citizens of the risks of procreating with hereditary illnesses.

To expand on the idea of better alternatives, the existing social support systems are an effective way of protecting the rights of the child without compromising the rights of the parents by inhibiting their right to bodily autonomy. Influenced by medical researchers and experts in the field, the state can inform its citizens of the risks of procreating with hereditary illness, an insufficient income, etcetera, as opposed to directly making the decision for the parents. The opposing side may argue that citizens with severe mental illness may not be able to process and interpret the implications of this information because they are not in a fit state to understand the implications of what they are doing. However, there are very few instances of citizens with severe mental conditions that are unable to process the implications of their actions—instead of stripping them of their right to bodily autonomy, the responsibility of being informed is passed onto who they are procreating with. There are multiple actors involved, meaning that there is a shared responsibility to

be informed of the risks of procreating under these conditions. The state cannot justify stripping its subjects of such a fundamental right.

Regardless of whether individuals fully understand the implications, it is immoral to take away their

right to procreate. The state’s imposition on the right to procreate intentionally and directly affects the well-being of those subjected to it, as it undermines the bodily autonomy of the citizens, causing emotional distress. However, by the same standard, bringing a child into an unfit environment is also immoral. The state intentionally limiting procreation harms the well-being of the parents, while parents intentionally bringing a child into unsafe conditions damages the well-being of the child. From this perspective, both circumstances are immoral, yet the child’s well-being outweighs that of the parents. Both the state imposing limits on the right procreate and the act of bringing a child into an unfit environment, both carry moral costs, but the latter is morally worse. A mandatory form of sterilisation violates the bodily autonomy of the parents and causes emotional distress. 

By contrast, when a child is born into unfit conditions that they did not choose, such as economic instability, neglect, hereditary illness, the resulting harm is direct and more severe. The child has no agency in the decision, which makes the moral weight of their suffering far greater than the parents’ loss of liberty. Therefore, the moral priority should be to prevent harm to the child, even if it requires limiting the civil liberties of the parents. While the child’s needs outweigh the parents’, there are better alternatives that do not

compromise the wellbeing of either. Instead of imposing on the right to procreate, a better solution would be to create better institutions for children that are birthed into unsuitable environments by creating social security funds that ensure every child has access to medical care regardless of parental income and reform child protection agencies to intervene in cases of neglect or abuse should focus less on punishment and more on rehabilitation and family support.

With regards to alternative for parents with heredity illness, the state would need to inform the parent of the implications of their actions, and if they are unable to process this information, the responsibility is passed to their partner—preventing government overreach and maximising the overall wellbeing of the

parent and the child. One could respond that relying on better institutions comes with significant costs, and it is subsequently better to prevent the problem before it happens than to wait for a child to be born into an unsafe environment, particularly when the parents may already be unable or unwilling to provide adequate care.

Utilitarianism argues that the right action is the one that produces the greatest overall happiness or least suffering for the greatest number of people. Hence, a utilitarian thinker might argue that the limits that are placed by the state on procreation may result in a better outcome as it prevents harm to children and reduces the strain on the social systems such as child protection services. However, the state cannot justify compromising the fundamental rights to bodily autonomy. No right should be compromised in any circumstance as rights transcend cost as the right to procreate is a core aspect of bodily autonomy. Furthermore, this does not minimise suffering as it still effects the wellbeing of the parents as opposed to the proposed solutions, but even if limiting procreation increased total societal well-being, doing so would violate the moral inviolability of individual rights, which cannot be overridden by calculations of utility.

The right to procreate must be understood as a fundamental civil liberty that the state cannot legitimately restrict. Legally, to grant the state powers over reproduction risks the violation of constitutional rights—and morally, coercion by the state in procreation undermines bodily autonomy and can inflict harm on individuals. While the opposing view of children being born into harmful environments is valid, the strengthening of child welfare protections and other social support systems is a more reasonable solution, as opposed to stripping citizens of the fundamental liberty to bodily autonomy. Therefore,

any attempt made by the state to impose upon the right to procreate is legally and morally unjust. 

The welfare of citizens and the preservation of bodily autonomy are not mutually exclusive; policies should seek to uphold both without resorting to the violation of the civil liberties of the people.

---

Bibliography

Casey, Katie. “My Body, My Choice: Defending Bodily Autonomy.” MSI Reproductive Choices, 28 Mar. 2022, www.msiunitedstates.org/my-body-my-choice-defending-bodily-autonomy/.

Department of Social Services. “CDSS Public Site > Reporting > Report Abuse > Child Protective Services.” www.cdss.ca.gov, 2022, www.cdss.ca.gov/reporting/report-abuse/child-protective-services.

Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. 1785. Cambridge,

Cambridge University Press, 2012. @misc{kim2018computationalmodelcommonsensemoral, title={A Computational Model of Commonsense Moral Decision Making}, author={Richard Kim and Max

Kleiman-Weiner and Andres Abeliuk and Edmond Awad and Sohan Dsouza and Josh Tenenbaum and Iyad Rahwan}, year={2018}, eprint={1801.04346}, archivePrefix={arXiv}, primaryClass={cs.AI},

url={https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.04346}, } The Metaphysics of Morals. 1797. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Kim, Richard, et al. “A Computational Model of Commonsense Moral Decision Making.”

ArXiv.org, 2018, arxiv.org/abs/1801.04346?utm_source=chatgpt.com. Accessed 15 Sept. 2025. Lander University. “The Hedonistic Calculus.” Lander.edu, 2019, philosophy.lander.edu/ethics/calculus.html.

Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty. London, J. W. Parker and Son, 1859. Utilitarianism. London, Parker, Son and Bourn, 1863.

PelegrinēsTheodosios N. Kant’s Conceptions of the Categorical Imperative and the Will.

London, Zeno, 1980.

Plato. The Republic. Plato, 380BC. “Skinner v. Oklahoma Ex Rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).” Justia Law, 2025, supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/316/535/. Accessed 6 Jun. 2025.